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COMMENTS

PROMOTERS' ABILITY TO SHARE PROFITS
OF SUCCESSFUL CORPORATE VENTURES

p ROMOTERS'
frequently experience difficulty in obtaining a
proper reward for their initiative in organizing a corporation.
This difficulty arises from two well-established principles of corporation law. The first of these rules is that a promoter stands in a fiduciary relation to the corporation, charged with a duty to exercise the
utmost good faith, as in cases of other trusts, so that he cannot lawfully make secret profits' in transactions relating to the promotion or
organization of the corporation, and must account to the corporation
for such profits if made.3 The second rule is that the promoter cannot
lawfully receive compensation for his effort unless the corporation
gives its approval after its organization has been accomplished.'
The promoter performs an indispensable function in the community.
He seeks out and discovers new business opportunities, formulates
plans to develop the opportunities, and assembles money and materials to put the plans into effect. By performing these functions the
promoter increases the wealth and contributes to the economic stability of the community.3 A promoter often cannot obtain compensation commensurate with the true value of his services if he must fully
reveal his trade secrets and is not permitted to resort to the puffing
allowed to ordinary tradesmen. A promoter often is required to account for secret profits even though investors have suffered no loss,
and in some cases even though investors have realized great gain.
Promoters must, of course, receive some form of encouragement if
they are to be induced to expend the time and effort necessary to develop their ideas. Therefore the courts, while invariably curbing
secret profits that injure innocent investors, have, on occasions, devised methods of circumventing the rule against secret profits if the
investor has realized gain through the success of the venture.
Much has been written on the liability of promoters for secret
profits.6 Usually these articles are built around one or two very welt
1. "Promoters" includes those persons who undertake to form a corporation and procure for it
rights, instrumentalities and capital to carry on its business.
2. The term "secret profits" refers to any benefit the promoter receives in a transaction with the
corporation but fails to reveal.
8. CLARK CORPORATIONS 136, sec. 48 (3rd ed. 1916).
4. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS 619, sec. 193 (Per. ed. 1932).
5. STEVENS ON CORPORATIONS 161, sec. 34 (1936).
6. E.g. see Manfred W. Edreich and Lucille C. Bunzl, Promoters' Contracts, 38 YALE L. J. loll
(1929), Notes 31 ILL. L. REV. 392 (1936), 26 ILL. L. REV. 340 (1931), 19 TEX. L. REV. 198 (1941).
3 Wis. L. REV. 442 (1926).
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known cases. One of these cases is Old Dominion Copper Mining and
Smelting Co. v. Bigelow.7 In that case the promoters planned to
capitalize the corporation at $3,750,000; to exchange certain property
they had acquired at a cost of $i,ooo,ooo and "intrinsically" worth
not over $2,000,000, for stock of the corporation valued at $3,250,ooo; and to sell at par for the corporation the remaining $5oo,ooo
of the corporation's stock to the general public for cash. The plan
was accomplished without providing the corporation with an independent board of directors to pass on its wisdom and without revealing to prospective purchasers of stock the fact that promoter profits
were expected. Although the purchase by the corporation of the promoters' property was to be fiully--completed--before any stock was
sold to the general public, the promoters, from the time the promotion
scheme was evolved, conte miplated that the corporation would sell
-stock to uninformed members of the public. On these facts, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the promoters were
fiduciaries of the corporation and that the sale breached their trust,
and wronged the corporation. The court further held this wrong
affected all stockholders, present and future, and rendered the -promoters liable to the corporation for the secret profits made in the
transaction.
The nature of the relationship between the promoter and the proposed corporation before organization is completed is not easily expressed. The courts, state and federal, at different times, -and under
varying circumstances, have referred to promoters as "agents," "mandatories," or "trustees," and have defined their liabilities accordingly.
But, regardless of the terms they use in referring to promoters, the
courts are consistent in their adherence to the rule that promoters do
not have a right to take profits secretly. The rule against secret profits
is based on the theory that small investors suffer if promoters are permitted to reap secret benefits. Probably, if the first case to arise had
been one in which all the stock offered for subscription had been taken
by a single rich man, the doctrine of the promoter's fiduciary duty
to the corporation would not have seemed so reasonable!
While a secret profit made through actual fraud or a secret profit
resulting in loss to investors relying on a promoter's representations
should clearly be restored, the tendency of the courts to find fraud
wherever secret profits are made, irrespective of injury to the investor,
may be unduly harsh. Nevertheless the courts look at the profit being
taken by the promoter and generally hold that the ultimate value of
7. 203 Mass. 159, 89 N. E. 193, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 314 (1909).
8. Bovay v. H. M. Byllesby & Co., 38 A. 2d 808 (Del, 1944).

9. R. D. Weston, Promoters' Liability: Old Dominion '. Bigelow, 30 HARV. L. REV. 44 (1916).
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the property to the corporation is immaterial." The courts feel that
the promoter has committed wrong in taking the profit secretly at
the expense of his associates, and that is the answer they give to the
claim that the property actually proved to be equal in value to the
price paid for it.
Although secret profits are officially frowned on, occasionally indirect methods are found to permit promoters to retain them. Sympathetic juries at times will come to the aid of promoters. Whether or
not a secret profit has been realized is a question of fact. Naturally,
there is considerable variance in the attitude of different juries as to the
extent promoters should go in revealing their profits."
The courts themselves have found means of limiting the rule against
secret profits. It has been held, for instance, that profits made by an
associate of the promoter in direct transactions with the corporation
are too remote to constitute secret profits of the promoter, even
though they ultimately accrue to his benefit."3
Some courts have held that the rule permitting a corporation to
sue to recover secret promoter profits does not apply where the promoters hold all the issued stock of the corporation at the time of
their transactions with it. This method of promotion became an early
device to evade liability for secret profits. In Old Dominion Copper
Mining and Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn," the facts of which are identical with those of the Bigelow case, previously discussed, the United
States Supreme Court held that the corporation did not have a cause
of action against the promoters because fraud could not be committed
where the promoters were the only stockholders of the corporation.
The court felt that it would be illogical to allow subsequent stockholders to disregard the previous assent to the transaction, which the
corporation, with continuing identity, had made.
The authorities generally hold that where the promoters organize
a corporation and transfer property to it in exchange for all its capital
stock, the corporation has no right of action to recover secret profits
made by the promoters.' This rule is not applied by a majority of the
courts, however, to cases where the stock received by the promoters
does not comprise all the stock which the corporation contemplates
issuing. 5 On the other hand, more recent decisions in a minority of
courts hold that corporate consent necessarily includes assent of contemplated future stockholders and that therefore the corporation
10. Victor Oil Co. v. Drum, 184 Cal. 226, 193 Pac. 243 (1920).
11. Boxrud v. Ronning Machinery Co., 217 Minn. 518, 15 N. W. 2d 112 (1944).

12. Koppitz-Melchers Inc. v. Koppitz, 315 Mich. 582, 24 N. W. 2d 220 (1946).
13. 210 U. S. 206, 52 L. Ed. 1025, 28 S. Ct. 643 (1908).

14. Hamilton v. Hamilton Mammoth Mines, 110 Or. 546, 223 Pac. 926 (1924).
15. Old Dominion Copper Mining and Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, (8upra Note 7).
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does not have a cause of action even in this situation.16 Where the promoters take all the stock but give part of it back, to the corporation
so that the corporation can sell it to the public to raise funds for the
operation of the business, the gift has been considered in itself evidence of a fraudulent intent to circumvent the fiduciary responsibility. 7
The corporation's right of action to recover promoters' profits
should be limited to situations in which injury results to stockholders
who have an interest in the corporation during the period of promotion. Any injury to stockholders must result from the fact that they
rely on the invitation of the promoters to purchase stock and that the
promoters failed to reveal a material fact, namely, their contemplated
profits. That uninformed investors purchase stock in the corporation
after the scheme of promotion has been consummated should not be
sufficient to create a right of action in the corporation. Any remedy
that the subsequent purchasers of stock might have should be against
their immediate vendors. 8 Property put into a new venture by promoters may, by its combination with other units or by efficient utilization, attain a value which it did not have at the time it was transferred
to the corporation. A feeble, uncertain venture may ripen into a
stable, prosperous concern. No reason is apparent why promoters
should not be permitted to sell stock in a corporation which they have
launched successfully without subjecting themselves to later liability
to the corporation based on a transaction with the corporation at a
time when only the promoters were interested in the venture. The
courts frequently allow a promoter to sell property to the corporation
for any price he can secure, providing only that he make no false
representation."9
Another devise which can be used by promoters to realize a profit
in a transaction with the corporation is to provide the corporation
with an independent board of directors."0 By selecting reasonably competent directors who act independently in the transaction with honesty
and integrity, the promoter can sell his plan to the public for whatever price he can convince them it is worth. This device, however,
will not avoid liability when it is evident that the directors are not
acting in genuine independence or honesty. The courts are inclined to
examine the boards of directors carefully to eliminate possible agreements between promoters and directors.
Even if there is an actual overvaluation of the promotor-vendor's
interest, it does not necessarily follow that the corporation is entitled
16. Note, 49 HARV. L. REv. 785 (1986).
17. McCandless v. Furlaud, 296 U. S. 140. 56 S. Ct. 41. 80 L. Ed. 121 (1985).
18. Jeffs v. Utah Power and Light Co.. 186 Me. 454, 12 A. 2d 592 (1940).
19. BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 166, sec. 49 (1937).

20. Downey v. Byrd, 171 Ga. 532, 156 S. E. 259, 79 A.L.R. 845 (1980).
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to relief. When the venture is of a highly speculative nature, the investors usually should know that the venture is speculative and that
the promoters expect sizeable profits if it happens to succeed."' The
corporate books are open to their inspection. Before a corporate right
of action is recognized, proof should be made that the investors relied
on misrepresentations by the promoters. By this logic, some promoter
profits which have not resulted in loss to the investor have been allowed.
Simply disclosing the fact of the profit to prospective stockholders
in the new corporation is sufficient to avoid promoter liability.2 2 Promoters have a right to organize a company and make a profit in the
sale to the company of the property they have bought, even though
they have secured it for the company, provided they disclose the fact
that they will make a profit. Such disclosure eliminates the secrecy
in the transaction. When the property proves worth the price asked
for it, there is no breach of fiduciary duty. By injecting into this approach the proposition that a reasonable investor in a scheme, which
is at all speculative, will realize that the promoter asks something
more than the established value of his plan at the time of the transaction, a wide field opens for the allowance of promoter profits which
are now considered secret.
Belief in the truth of a statement in a prospectus has long been a
defense against actions for deceit. 3 As long as the representation is
made bona fide, want of due care does not destroy the defense. While
those who put before the public a prospectus to induce them to enter
a commercial enterprise should be vigilant to make their representations in accordance with fact, yet carelessness is not fraud. Honest
belief is a defense even if there is lack of care in making the representation. Under the Securities Jct of 1933 the promoter issuing a
prospectus containing false information has the burden of proving his
good faith. 4
Some courts are not so rigid in their demand for a full and open
revelation of all the benefits that the promoter expects to reap. Where
the promoter's margin of profit becomes smaller, fraud is more difficult to isolate. Thus a promoter's profit of $3,000 in a transaction involving $12,5oo, but only $Soo of the promoter's funds, was held not
to constitute fraudulent promoter profits.22 This court was able to
find value for the property purchased by the corporation, especially
21. Miller v. Youmans-Burke Oil and Gas Co., 278 Mich. 647, 270 N. W. 819 (1937).
22. Henderson v. Plymouth Oil Co., 16 Del. Ch. 347, 141 Atl. 197 (1928).
23. Derry v. Peek, L. R. 14 App. Cases 337 (1889). See PROSSER ON TORTS 726 (1941) for modifications of this rule.
24. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C.A. sec. 77 (1941). Cf. Kountze v. Kennedy, 147 N. Y. 124, 41 N. E.
414 (1895).
25. Masberg v. Granville, 201 Ala. 5, 75 So. 154 (1917).
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since the actual price the corporation paid was in reality a good investment.
Property is not considered overvalued in sales by promoters to
corporations merely because it subsequently turns out to be so.2"
There is, of course, a limit beyond which the courts will not go in sustaining the issue of stock for property taken at overvaluation. Consequently, if the property turned in is practically worthless, or is unsubstantial and shadowy in its nature, the courts will hold that there
is no payment at all. On the other hand, when the property turns
out to be a very good investment, consideration for the price paid
should not be difficult to find.
One decision has been so blunt as to base liability on whether the
corporation or any of its stockholders suffer tangible wrong or injury."
That the promoters who thought of the plan reaped greater profits
than the other stockholders was considered immaterial. This decision
was based on the reasoning that fraud, to be actionable, must result
in injury, and since the property sold to the covporation proved to be
worth the price paid, no injury resulted. The courts readily uphold the
right of a corporation to force promoters to permit it to utilize a
promotion plan which the promoters wish to withdraw and use for
their own personal benefit.' The courts in effect recognize that the
consolidation of properties may result in an increased value, one much
greater than the sum of the costs of the individual pieces of property.
The ability of the promoter to foresee that a few small tracts of
mineral land belonging to many owners are worth much more in the
hands of one owner results in an increase in the value of the properties. Since such value is recognized for the purpose of requiring a
promoter to deliver properties to a corporation, perhaps it should
also be recognized for the purpose of allowing the promoter to benefit from his foresight.
Stock subscribers should be charged with the realization of the
speculative nature of their investment. 9 Every subscriber to stock in
a new venture should realize that any return therefrom would be
dependent upon its development. The stock which is issued, especially
in cases of promotion of new ideas of the development of mineral
fields, are virtually worthless at the time of issue, and will continue
so unless the property or idea is developed. A promoter must work
diligently, often for several years, to prepare- the idea he is developing in a form acceptable to the public, and much effort is required to
sell the plan to the public. Therefore, those who subscribe to the
26. Smith v. Schmitt, 112 Or. 687, 231 Pac. 176 (1924).
27. Roberson v.'Draney, 53 Utah 263, 178 Pac. 35 (1919).
28. Moore v. Warrior Coal & Land Co., 178 Ala. 234, 59 So. 219 (1912).

29. Burneagle Coal and Coke Corp. v. Henritze, 139 Va. 442, 124 S. E. 224 (1924).
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stock should be charged not only with knowledge of all that the
records show and all that the statements to the corporation commission disclose, but also with the knowledge that the promoters expect
in some way to be paid for their diligent and persistent effort.
In all the methods which the courts utilize to allow the promoter to
make a profit in his transactions with the corporation, it should be
noted that the true object in securing approval by the corporation of
the transactions or in charging it with knowledge of the profit the
promoter makes is in every case to allow the promoter in effect to
avail himself of the rule that a principal may condone a breach of
trust committed by the agent. 3' In view of the harshness of strictly
enforcing the rule against secret promoters profits, and the occasional
attempts to find some way of circumventing it in order to reach a
more equitable result, it is suggested that a modification of the rule
be adopted in cases where the property proves to be worth the sale
price.
Reasonable people should recognize that initiative must be rewarded. So-called "secret profit" cases usually turn on a technical point hidden by some well-worn term such as "fiduciary relationship" or
"trust." In truth, the rule against secret profits when strictly applied
often merely changes the rewards from one person desiring as large
a share as he can get to the hands of another equally greedy person
who has found a way to get more than his bargain. If courts were
free to look beyond this rule and seek true justice in a direct way, a
great handicap on business venture would be eliminated. So long as a
promoter must reveal in detail each item of benefit he expects to
reap, he will be at the mercy of those investors to whom the information is revealed.
Even if there is a relaxation of the necessity of full revelation and
a narrowing of the term "secret profits" as applied to promoters'
profits, the public will still be adequately protected by the tests of
active deception and actual over-valuation. At the same time, the
necessary incentive to induce the continued development of promotion
schemes will be achieved and the public will thereby reap a substantial
benefit.
ALVIN GILMORE.
30. Comment, 34 Mica. L. REv. 1189 (1936).

